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In his paper, “Cosmology and Metanoia: A Buddhist Path to Process 
Thought for the West,” James Fredericks offers a stimulating discus­
sion of Whitehead and Buddhism, especially as the latter finds expres­
sion in the thought of Nishida KitarO and Tanabe Hajime, two key thinkers 
in the Kyoto School. Fredericks considers Whitehead’s unique­
ness in the modern West, the cosmologies of Whitehead and Nishi­
da, and Tanabe’s philosophy. A highlight of Fredericks’ paper is his 
excellent treatment of Tanabe, especially Tanabe’s critique of reason, 
formulation of the way of repentance or metanoia (zange), and con­
sideration of history and ethics. In expanding the ongoing Whitehead- 
Nishida dialogue to include Tanabe, Fredericks taps a rich methodo­
logical and philosophical vein.
Each of the various ideas and issues formulated by Fredericks pro­
vides a focal point for discussion. Given the overall strength of 
Fredericks’ discussion, this response focuses simply on several of the 
ideas and issues that strike this reader as most provocative: 1. 
Whitehead’s own encounter with Buddhism, 2. the degree of non­
dualism in the cosmologies of Whitehead and Nishida, 3. Tanabe’s 
critique of Nishida along the lines of Other-power and self-power, and 
4. soteriology in the three perspectives. As will be obvious in the pages 
to follow, much of this response is to Whitehead, Nishida, and 
Tanabe, rather than to Fredericks; insofar as the ideas presented in this 
response begin with Fredericks’ remarks, they perhaps can contribute 
to further dialogue.
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In the first section of his paper, Fredericks sketches how 
Whitehead’s philosophy diverges from the standpoints of traditional 
Christian theism and the Enlightenment. Discussing the relationship be­
tween God and the World, facts, and value, Fredericks touches upon 
Whitehead’s encounter with Buddhism.1 He cites Whitehead’s state­
ment in Religion in the Making (p. 50) that Buddhism is “a metaphys­
ics generating a religion.” (p. 113) Though metaphysics and soteriology 
are closely connected in Buddhism Whitehead’s view falls short of an 
accurate portrayal of Buddhism. Whitehead’s statement implies that 
Gautama, the historical Buddha, formulated a metaphysical system 
from which he or his followers developed a religious system. Judging 
from traditional accounts of the life of the Buddha and from what are 
recorded in the sutra literature as his actual talks, Whitehead misses the 
boat. Primary texts indicate that Gautama’s central concern was the 
cessation of suffering (Sanskrit, duhkha), a problem that is religious, 
not metaphysical. He sought in vain in the religious and philosophical 
systems at his disposal for a solution to this fundamental problem, and 
at the end of a seven-year religious quest he realized the cessation of 
suffering in himself. Soon thereafter he began to reflect on his reli gious 
experience, give talks about how others could follow the same path, 
and in the process began to give his religious insight an expression that 
is in part metaphysical. In articulating a way to eradicate suffering, 
however, Gautama spoke primarily in moral and psychological terms 
and, as clearly indicated in such sources as the Majjhima Nik ay a, 
cautioned his followers about the pit falls of metaphysical speculation, 
1 At one point Fredericks refers to Whitehead's preoccupation with the Buddhist 
religious vision?* (p. 114) This wording indicates that Whitehead not only studied Bud­
dhism but focused a significant portion of his attention to it. Thought at this point in 
time it is difficult to ascertain the extent of Whitehead's encounter with Buddhism, we 
do find that explicit references to Buddhism are few and far between in Whitehead's 
major writings. Although Whitehead compares Buddhism and Christianity in Religion 
in the Making, albeit in ways which, as we will see, distort Buddhism, he docs not refer 
to Buddhism in Science and the Modern World’, he mentions it briefly three times in 
Process and Reality', he does not discuss it in The Function of Reason; in Adventures 
of Ideas he refers to Buddhism once, inaccurately as the epitome of the religious at­
titude that claims that the passing ''shadows" in our experience will end and is tempted 
"to abandon the immediate experience of this world as a lost cause" (p. 32); he does 
not discuss Buddhism in Modes of Thought.
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which in most cases does not directly effect a religious transformation 
in the speculator or may even hinder it. In short, to convey accurately 
the Buddhist tradition, one perhaps should state that * 'Buddhism is a 
religious experience generating a metaphysics.”
Of course, the significance of Fredericks’ paper does not hinge 
on the degree to which Whitehead correctly understood Buddhism. 
As Fredericks outlines in his paper, striking similarities exist between 
the two outlooks, including the element of non-dualism. One of 
Whitehead’s great achievements is the metaphysical bridging of the 
chasm separating God and the world. Similarly, on the basis of the 
Mahayana Buddhist tradition, Nishida wrote at length in his writings 
on the “absolutely contradictory self-identity” between nirvana and 
samsara, one and many, time and space. We must examine, however, 
the degree to which these philosophies in fact sustain the “uncom­
promised” non-dualism mentioned by Fredericks.
Whitehead’s discussion of actual occasions and God as the non­
temporal actual entity tends to fall short of “uncompromised” non- 
dualism. One can argue that Whitehead advances an emphasis on 
the one at the expense of the many, and this point connects with 
Whitehead’s soteriology. Whitehead locates evil and part of the role of 
God in perishing: “The ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper 
than any specific evil. It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 
‘perpetual perishing.’ ”2 Wrestling with this fact, Whitehead argues 
that every actual occasion, even though its enjoyment immediately 
perishes, is directly prehended by God and preserved forever without 
loss—perhaps with the exception of subjective immediacy—in the 
everlasting consequent nature of God. This is “perfected actuality, in 
which the many are one everlastingly, without the qualification of any 
loss either of individual identity or completeness of unity. In everlast­
ingness, immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality.”3 In this 
way, God’s prehension of actual occasions “up” out of the process of 
becoming and the retention of the many in the everlasting consequent 
nature of God circumvent perishing and provide actual occasions
2 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (corrected edition), ed. David Ray 
Griffin and Donald Sherburne (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978), p. 
340.
3 Ibid., pp. 350-351.
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with “objective immortality.” But, this soteriological overcoming 
of perishing accords greater significance to God than to the world. 
That is to say, objective immortality features a movement from the 
many (all actual occasions) to the one (God; more specifically, the 
everlasting consequent nature of God). Of course, important in 
Whitehead’s formulation of salvation and morality are the ideas that 
“the many are one everlastingly”—that all occasions are retained 
forever in the “one” called God—and that by virtue of this no value is 
lost; yet we can make the case that in this perspective the one (God) 
takes precedence over the many, rendering Whitehead’s perspective a 
“compromised” non-dualism.
When we turn to Nishida, we find him advancing what at first glance 
appears to be a rigorous non-dualism, but as Tanabe and Fredericks 
point out, Nishida perhaps falls short of “uncompromised non- 
dualism” as well. In an essay entitled “The Unity of Opposites,” 
Nishida writes, “At the base of the world, there are neither the many 
nor the one; it is a world of absolute unity of opposites, where the 
many and the one deny each other.”4 This world is a dynamic process.
4 Kitaro Nishida, “The Unity of Opposites,” tr. Robert Shinzinger, in Intelligibility 
and the Philosophy of Nothingness (Tokyo: Maruzen Co., Ltd., 1958), p. 168.
5 Ibid., pp. 166-167.
That the one is the one of the many, indicates space­
character; the mechanism has the form: from the many 
towards the one; it means movement from the past into the 
future. On the contrary, the fact that the many are the many 
of the one means the dynamic time-character of the world; 
purpose and evolution have the form: from the one towards 
the many; it means movement from the future into the past. 
The world as a unity of opposites, from the formed towards 
the forming, is essentially a world from present to present.5
This exposition of a non-dualistic world that is 100% unified (not-two) 
and 100% plural (not-one) and that is neither merely mechanistic nor 
merely teleological bases itself on the Buddhist notions of dependent 
co-arising (Sanskrit, pratltya-samutpada) and emptiness (Skt., 
shQnyatd).
Although Nishida’s metaphysical approach appears rigorously non-
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dualistic in such essays as “The Unity of Opposites” (1939), in other 
writings he falls short of a stance of uncompromised dualism. Early in 
An inquiry into the Good he refers to pure experience prior to the 
separation of subject and object; he expands this in terms of God, the 
unifying power and in this sense the foundation of the universe, which 
is a manifestation of God. As Tanabe points out, Nishida’s discussion 
of intellectual intuition in this context points in the direction of the 
precedence of an underlying oneness or unity at the expense of the par­
ticular parts. Rigorous non-dualism in Buddhism does not derive sim­
ply from the dimension of that which is prior to the separation of sub­
ject and object (not-two) but rather from the dynamism that also in­
cludes subject and object (not-one).6 Further, we must join Tanabe in 
asking whether Nishida’s articulation of nothingness in terms of univer­
sals, based to a large extent on Hegel, does justice to the non-dualism 
in Buddhism.
6 This is an elusive facet of Nishida’s thought. At numerous points in his later 
writings he states that pure experience and God, understood as absolute nothingness or 
“place,” do not take precedence over particular individuals, but rather make their con­
crete particularity possible. He also argues in his treatment of place that individuals are 
determinations of nothingness and at the same time, given the nature of nothingness, 
individuals are their own self-determinations as well.
7 Nishida KitarO, Zen no kenkyQ (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 1980), pp. 226-227.
Nishida might argue in this context that Tanabe is wide of the mark 
in arguing that Nishida advances a type of intuition and ontology of 
emanation derivative of the philosophy of Plotinus. As James Heisig 
writes in his foreword to the English translation of Philosophy as 
Metanoetics, Nishida’s notion of intuition and enveloping levels of 
reality does not necessarily derive from Plotinus. More specifically, 
Nishida would disagree with Tanabe’s claim that, in Fredericks’ words, 
“the metaphor of ‘place* presumes that the absolute can be known 
noetically in an aesthetic intuition into the undifferentiated immediacy 
of being, (p. 121) for Nishida states that the unifying power he is refer­
ring to as God eludes our knowing and reason: “This unity itself can­
not become the object of knowledge; we can become it and function, 
but we cannot know it. True self-awareness exists upon the activity of 
the will, not upon intellectual reflection.”7
Tanabe also claims that Nishida’s “ordinary mysticism” does not call
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for the death and resurrection of the ego. To some extent this critique 
parallels the classic tariki-jiriki (other-power/self-power) debate be­
tween Pure Land and Zen, represented here by Tanabe and Nishida. 
As Fredericks points out, Tanabe argues that it is through Other-power 
that one dies to the ego-self and realizes nothingness. Tanabe conveys 
this in a critique of Nishida’s approach:
Witness to nothingness is not the sort of thing that can be in­
tuited as a ground, or locus, of practice. Such a view is pure il­
lusion in that it interprets practice not as the action of Other- 
power through which the self dies and comes to nothingness, 
but as the function of the life of self-power that gives form to 
existence as an expression of oneness with existence.8
’ Hajime Tanabe, Philosophy as Metanoetics, tr. Yoshinori Takeuchi (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986), pp. 165-166.
9 Tanabe, p. 162.
10 Ibid., p. 169.
A question arises here: to what extent does Tanabe’s critique stem from 
a careful reading of Nishida (and Zen, for that matter) and to what ex­
tent does it stem from Pure Land views of Zen as a path of self-power?
Overall, Tanabe overlooks the degree to which Zen and Nishida em­
phasize the negation of the ego-self and its “self-power.” Of course, 
Tanabe appears to recognize the element of negation in Zen when he 
takes up the notion of the Great Death; yet he views the Great Death as 
future-oriented “total affirmation and voluntary acceptance of one’s 
death.”9 Tanabe’s close linkage of the Great Death with future 
physical death falls short of the deepest sense of the Great Death: a 
negation of entanglement in ordinary ego-consciousness, which con­
stitutes a liberating existential transformation here and now. In addi­
tion, when examining the Zen term kenshO (seeing/realizing one’s 
nature), Tanabe states, “It [Zen] does not confront the self because it 
already is the self.”10 This notion that Zen practice does not confront 
the ego-self and that it affirms the ordinary ego-self as the awakened 
“self” fails to grasp the actual nature of Zen and Nishida’s articulation 
of it.
The negation or “death” of the ego-self appears frequently in 
Nishida’s writings. For example, in his first work, An Inquiry into the
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Good, Nishida writes, “The method through which we can know the 
true self and fuse with God is our self-attainment of the power of the 
union of subject and object. To acquire this power is to kill our false 
self and, after dying once to worldly desire, gain new life.”11 Three 
sentences later he writes, “Christianity calls this rebirth; Buddhism 
calls it kenshd.”n This theme of death and “resurrection” jumps out 
at the reader not only in this, Nishida’s first work, but also in the works 
that follow, including his last major piece, “The Logic of Place and a 
Religious World View,” completed in the same year as Philosophy as 
Metanoetics (1945). In this essay, Nishida stresses repeatedly that the 
self encounters the divine only through dying. At one point he writes, 
“When a relative being opposes the absolute, it must die. It must 
become nothingness. The self encounters God only in a relationship of 
inverse polarity, only through dying. It is linked to God only in this 
way.”13 Even more provocative for the discussion at hand is what 
Nishida goes on to write several pages later:
Essentially, there can be no religion of self-power. This is in­
deed a contradictory concept. Buddhists themselves have 
been mistaken about it.
The concepts of self-power and Other-power, the Zen sect 
and True Pure Land Sect, as forms of Mahayana Buddhism, 
hold the same position. ... In any religion, it is the effort of 
self-negation that is necessary.14
This issue of the “death” of the ego-self brings us back to soteriology. 
As we saw before, Whitehead regards perishing as the basic evil, 
and as a salvific response to this God preserves the actual occasion 
forever in God’s consequent nature—without any type of spiritual 
death.15 The Buddhist tradition represented by Nishida and Tanabe
" Nishida. Zen no kenkyQ, pp. 206-207.
12 Ibid., p. 207.
” Kitaro Nishida, “The Logic of Place and a Religious World-View,’’ Part II, tr. 
David Dilworth as “Religious Consciousness and the Logic of the PrajnUparamita 
SQtra,” Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. XXV, Nos. 1-2 (1970), p. 206.
14 Ibid., pp. 215-216.
” Fredericks takes up what ostensibly is a statement about religious salvation by 
Whitehead, who argues in Science and the Modern World that the “salvation of reali-
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consider “perishing” to be characteristic of all actual occasions or 
entities. In fact, this notion occupies a position in the central Buddhist 
philosophical triad of anatman, duhkha, and anitya, Mahayana Bud­
dhism sees perishing as a metaphysically-given condition of reality, of 
all reality—it is an inescapable fact, and there is no everlasting realm 
in which “immortality” of actual occasions and serially-ordered socie­
ties is achieved. Further, Buddhism argues that the basic “evil” is not 
perishing but the effort of the human to fabricate an enduring and 
independent “self’ and to cling to this fabrication and things that 
support this effort, even though all “things” perish in the impermanent 
process of which we are part. To Buddhism and Zen, our entanglement 
in the dualistic ego-self, not perishing per sc, is regarded as the true 
source of suffering and evil. Rather than affirming (albeit, indirectly) 
the ego-self by speaking of occasions of experience (constituting a 
serially-ordered society) attaining objective immortality in the conse­
quent nature of God, Buddhism works to eradicate entanglement in the 
ego-self and bring about a “turning over of consciousness:” (Skt., 
pravrtti-vijnann). In the original teachings of the Buddha and in 
Zen, religious liberation occurs through an Awakening realized upon 
the “death” of the ego-self, through a way of experiencing/being 
that lies beyond the ego-self and its concern for its own assertion and 
immortality. This Awakening is not outside the realm of perishing, but 
in its midst: upon the “death” of the ego-self, nirvana is samsara and 
samsara is nirvana. Moreover, from Nishida’s perspective, true impor­
tance and value are first realized in this “conversion” (metanoia):
In transcending in that direction [beyond the ego-self] the 
highest value of negation of values becomes visible: it is the 
religious value. The religious value, therefore, means ab­
solute negation of the self. The religious ideal consists in 
becoming a being which denies itself. There is a seeing with-
ty” lies in matter-of-fact entities. One cannot help wondering, however, whether 
Whitehead's statement should be taken as expressing a soteriological stance per se or as 
offering a poetical way of rejoicing that by virtue of the existence of concrete par­
ticulars, reality is “saved” from being what Whitehead calls in the previous sentence 
“the nonentity of indefiniteness” (see Whitehead, Science and the Modem World, 
New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 94.
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out a seeing one, and a hearing without a hearing one. This 
is salvation.16
16 Kitaro Nishida, “The Intelligible World,” tr. Robert Schinzinger, in Intelligibility 
and the Philosophy of Nothingness (Tokyo: Maruzen Co., Ltd., 1958), p. 133.
17 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Macmillan Co., 1933), 
p. 285.
18 Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: Macmillan Co., 
1926), p. 151.
19 George F. Thomas, Religious Philosophies of the West (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1965), p. 378.
20 Nishida, “The Logic of Place and a Religious World View,” p. 216.
In short, then, while Whitehead sets forth objective immorality as 
that which circumvents perishing—without calling the ego-self (be it a 
serially-ordered society or a self-centered way of experiencing) into 
question—Zen and Nishida deny the ego-self without negating the in­
evitable perishing that Buddhism sees as value-neutral. Of course, 
Whitehead does speak of Peace as “self-control at its widest—at the 
width where the ‘self has been lost, and interest has been transferred 
to coordinations wider than personality,”17 and regards God as “that 
function in the world by reason of which our purposes are directed 
to ends which in our own consciousness are impartial as to our own 
interests.”18 Nevertheless, perhaps Nishida and Tanabe would agree 
with George F. Thomas’ appraisal of Whitehead’s notion of Peace: 
“Does it not rest upon a rather optimistic estimate of man’s moral 
and spiritual capacity to respond to ‘ideal aims’ and to overcome 
self-centeredness?”19 In short, given that the “death” of the ordinary 
self and its power is crucial not only to Tanabe but also to Nishida, 
we must ask from the perspective of the Kyoto School whether 
Whitehead’s positive view of the “self” is penetrating enough to move 
him beyond metaphysics into profound religious concern. Again, as 
Nishida writes, “In any religion, it is the effort of self-negation that is 
necessary.”20
One might also argue that by viewing actual occasions and serially-or­
dered societies in a generally positive manner and thereby formulating 
salvation in terms of objective immortality rather than through nega­
tion—brought about in experiencing a metanoia, repentance (zange), 
and faith in the Other-power of Amida or in dying the Great Death—
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Whitehead not only diverges from 4‘uncompromised non-dualism” 
but perhaps also stretches his own metaphysical principles. In a sense, 
God is not simply the chief exemplification of the categories in 
Whitehead’s system, but also in certain respects an exception to them. 
As Masao Abe has pointed out, in the final analysis God is not on­
tologically the same as other entities (i.e., actual occasions): “In 
short, . . . although there is interaction between the world and God, 
God finally transcends the world. God is more self-creative, more in­
clusive, more influential, than any other temporal actual entities. He 
alone is everlasting.”21 Although that God is more creative, inclusive, 
and influential does not, to the present writer, necessarily constitute an 
ontological difference, that the consequent nature of God and its con­
tents are everlasting (“immortal”) constitutes a clearly qualitative and 
ontological difference between God and actual occasions. In this 
regard, Whitehead appears to transcend his reformed subjectivist doc­
trine, the touchstone of his speculation, and enter the realm of belief.
21 Masao Abe, “Mahayana Buddhism and Whitehead—A View by a Lay Student of 
Whitehead’s Philosophy,” Philosophy East and West, 25 (October 1975), p. 418.
22 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 3.
This discussion of non-dualism, metanoia, and soteriology brings 
us to one final question: to what extent can we claim that Whitehead 
does indeed have a soteriology? More precisely, to what extent does 
Whitehead’s notion of salvation address the human situation squarely 
and, in response, offer a spiritually satisfying notion of salvation? Of 
course, Whitehead states on the first page of Process and Reality that 
his main concern there is Speculative Philosophy as “the endeavor to 
frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of 
which every element of our experience can be interpreted.”22 Given 
what we have discussed about Whitehead’s soteriology and the 
religious philosophies of Nishida and Tanabe, we perhaps are led to 
the conclusion that Whitehead’s standpoint—as opposed to the de­
velopment of it by process theologians—is “a metaphysics seeking a 
religion.”
In this regard, Fredericks’ provocative notion of giving Whitehead a 
new religious reading through the mediation of Buddhism in its Pure 
Land and Zen forms constitutes a stimulating area of discussion for 
process theologians and Buddhists alike. Perhaps the fruits of this
137
IVES
go beyond giving Westerners an approach to Whitehead, however. 
Fredericks* program can also offer process thinkers an avenue for 
deepening the religious facets of Whitehead’s world view, especially in 
the areas of religious practice, repentance, and the negation of self­
power. In addition, when engaged in as dialogue, this approach can 
also provide a way for members of the Kyoto School and Buddhists in 
general to clarify or reformulate certain knotty areas of Buddhist 
philosophy, especially the issues of causality, time, and value.
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